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BOOK REVIEW
ought to have the power to exert safeguards against such interference with the
course of trial, as was found in this case.
With Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting, the judgment of the Texas Court was reversed and the petitioners were discharged from custody for constructive criminal contempt.
James D. Sullivan

BOOK REVIEWS
Kazzan ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DavoRcE, TmA
EoiTIoIz, by John
W. Morland.1 Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1946. 1367 pages. $15.00Dean Morland's book, while not so separated, may be divided into four parts.
The first part, consisting of the first forty-two chapters of 774 pages, treats of
the substantive law of marriage, annulment, breach of promise, alienation of affections, separation agreements, separate maintenance, divorce, alimony, counsel fees
and custody of children.
The second part, consisting of ten chapters of 104 pages. treats with problems
of a procedural nature such as presumptions, burden of proof, parties, venue,
process, service, pleadings, evidence, decrees, trial and appeal.
The third part, consisting of four chapters of 170 pages, is comprised of numerous forms with respect to complaints, petitions, process and decrees relating to
divorce, contempt, annulment, separate maintenance and like subject matter.
The fourth part, consisting of three chapters of 190 pages, contains a summary
of the statutes abolishing actions for breach of promise, alienation of affections,
seduction and criminal conversation, and a synopsis of the statutes of the various
states and territories with respect to marriage and divorce.
In view of the lengthy index consisting of 119 pages, the book could also be
said to have a fifth part. In referring to this point, Dean Morland is to be commended for the work he has done in compiling a detailed index and in thus making
his book readily usable by both lawyer and student.
In a book dealing with such a vast amount of law covering the various jurisdictions in the field of domestic relations, it is necessary to confine much of the
text to bare statements of principles or of decisions. In a number of situations,
however, Dean Morland has discussed the pros and cons with respect to certain
conficting decisions and points of view of the various courts. The reviewer regrets that more space was not given to the personal views and arguments of the
author, although, as might be expected, the views of the author and of the reviewer
do not always coincide. For example, the author devotes considerable space to
arguments favoring abolition of common law marriages which still are recognized
in some eighteen jurisdictions. Probably few would disagree with his stand
on this matter. The impression is made, however, that such abolition should
come about not by legislation alone, but by judicial interpretation of the existing
statutes. At the time most of the marriage statutes in question were passed or
modified, the legislatures were well aware of the interpretation given to such
statutes by the courts, that is, that the formal requirements were directory andnot mandatory. In the opinion of the reviewer, abolition of common law marriage by statutory construction would, in most cases, at the present time be judicial
legislation and judicial legislation has already gone too far. Too many statutes
mean nothing because the courts either ignore them, misinterpret them, or hold
them unconstitutional, primarily because such statutes do not meet the particular
court's views of what the law should be.
I Dean, School of Law, Valparaiso University.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Dean Morland repeats the often repeated and accepted proposition that the
existence of a statutory ground is a condition precedent to a divorce and that a
marriage may be terminable only by law and not by the consent of the parties.
In his preface, he says, "It is submitted that courts are and have ever been opposed to divorce except where the marriage in question has failed and the plaintiff has affirmatively established hi* or her right to a divorce on the grounds laid
down by the statute." Subsequently, in treating of marriage, he adds, "Marriage
is a social institution regulated by public authority... .It cannot -be rescinded by
either party or both at their desire, for its conditions are fixed -by law." Later
in treating with divorce, he further states, "The grounds for divorce are purely
statutory. . . . It follows that the contract of marriage can be dissolved for a
statutory reason and cannot be dissolved as an ordinary contract at the desire
of the parties."
In spite of these high-sounding words, the recent ratio of divorce to marriage
throughout the country has been one to three.
Unquestionably, most of the complainants have established affirmatively by
words, under oath, that a ground for divorce exists under the statutes of the particular jurisdiction; but it is probably true that in the majority of the uncontested
cases a true legal basis for a divorce does not exist, and, as Dean Morland says,
"generally more than 85% of the divorce cases are without contest." It is a generally accepted fact that a majority of such suits are collusive, the facts exaggerated or concealed, based on perjury or subject to legal defenses. In other
words, if such suits were honestly contested, a high percentage could not be sustained. The net result is a divorce in which the consent of the parties is the actual prerequisite; and divorces are, in fact, granted where the plaintiff has not
"affirmatively established his or her right to a divorce on the ground laid down
by the statute," and, in fact, marriage can be "rescinded" by the parties "at their
desire," and marriages, in fact, can be dissolved without a statutory reason and
"as an ordinary contract at the desire of the parties" by going through what is
treated as a formality.
There was a time in the United States when it could quite generally be said
that divorce was granted only to an innocent spouse as against a guilty spouse.
As indicated by the author, there is a trend away from this view.
With respect
to this trend, a writer quoted by the author states, "There is hope that mankind
will gradually move away from the fault principle with its orientation to the
past and adopt a forward looking attitude of cooperation for the future shaping
of sound human relations."
It is not uncommon for certain people today to condemn, not the guilty
spouse, but the innocent spouse, for not giving the guilty one his freedom to remarry. The innocent spouse is apparently cruel in not giving the guilty spouse
an opportunity to wreck someone else's life. They indicate that any holding to
the contrary would be against public policy and good morals. In fact, a trial
judge in a recent Illinois decision Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 Ill. 290, 49 N. E.
(2d) 25 (1943) stated, "The court does not believe it is wise for people living
apart to be still married to each other. It does not make for good morality. She
does not want him, and still does not want to give him his freedom."
In contrast, one might note the teachings of other authorities. The following
quotation from Mark, Chapter X, v. 11-12, might be apropos: "And he sath
to them: Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth
adultery against her. And if the wife shall put away her husband, and be married
to another, she committeth adultery."
Leo 0. McCabe*
*Professor of Law, De Paul University College of Law.

